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	<title>Oracle of ONE1 &#187; Privacy</title>
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	<description>Obscure words of unity</description>
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		<title>Browser Fingerprinting</title>
		<link>http://dvector.com/oracle/2010/05/17/browser-fingerprinting/</link>
		<comments>http://dvector.com/oracle/2010/05/17/browser-fingerprinting/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 May 2010 19:14:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>one1</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eff]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fingerprint]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dvector.com/oracle/?p=373</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[EFF has released an interesting study they have completed on the effectiveness of browser fingerprinting. What they found was that the great majority of browsers are easily and uniquely fingerprinted. In fact, &#8220;We identifieded only three groups of browser with comparatively good resistance to fingerprinting: those that block JavaScript, those that use TorButton, and certain [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>EFF has released an interesting study they have completed on the effectiveness of browser fingerprinting. What they found was that the great majority of browsers are easily and uniquely fingerprinted. In fact, &#8220;We identifieded only three groups of browser with comparatively good resistance to fingerprinting: those that block JavaScript, those that use TorButton, and certain types of smartphone.&#8221;</p>
<p><span id="more-373"></span><br />
Browser fingerprinting is performing a series of tests to attempt to uniquely identify a browser and the machine from which it is being used. If one is able to fingerprint a browser, then one may reasonably assume that the person using the machine is consistent. The ability to fingerprint punches a huge hole in various techniques used to maintain privacy or anonymity while browsing.</p>
<p>Here is more information from EFF:</p>
<ul>
<li> <a title="Browser Fingerprinting" href="http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2010/05/13">EFF Research Shows More Than 8 in 10 Browsers Have Unique, Trackable Signatures</a></li>
<li><a title="Browser Uniqueness White Paper" href="https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf">Browser Uniqueness White Paper</a></li>
<li><a title="Panopticlick" href="http://panopticlick.eff.org">How unique is your browser?</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Some of the bits of information that your browser exposes to allow it be be fingerprinted include:</p>
<ul>
<li>Browser plugins</li>
<li>Installed system fonts</li>
</ul>
<p>These bits of information are only available using javascript. Disabling javascript certainly does enhance your privacy but it also negatively impacts your online experience.</p>
<p>This is an area that requires more research and the development of anti-fingerprinting techniques.</p>
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		<title>Digital Books, My Opinion</title>
		<link>http://dvector.com/oracle/2010/02/19/digital-books-my-opinion/</link>
		<comments>http://dvector.com/oracle/2010/02/19/digital-books-my-opinion/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 22:31:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>one1</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[karma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[books]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dvector.com/oracle/?p=361</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As an avid reader and a IT professional, I am often asked my opinion on digital books. Yes, I do have an opinion but it is sometimes complicated.
The idea of digital books on an electronic reader is great but the books are often encumbered and the electronic readers are not even close to the ideal. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As an avid reader and a IT professional, I am often asked my opinion on digital books. Yes, I do have an opinion but it is sometimes complicated.</p>
<p>The idea of digital books on an electronic reader is great but the books are often encumbered and the electronic readers are not even close to the ideal. Will we ever get there? I think eventually the readers will approach the ideal but I am not as certain about the digital content.</p>
<p><span id="more-361"></span>Why am I concerned about the content? Well, think of the things you can and cannot do with a paper book. Then think about how you would be able to accomplish the same things with digital content while preventing lender abuse. It gets complex quickly and typically involves some type of Digital Rights Management (DRM).</p>
<p>Once you involve DRM, questions arise over who owns the digital book. Do you own the book you purchased or did you just purchase a set of viewing rights? Also with DRM, there is a required communication between the reader device and the rights management software. This then involves issues of privacy and censorship.</p>
<p>As an aide to determining the future of our digital books, I suggest you visit EFF&#8217;s <a title="Digital Books and Your Rights" href="https://www.eff.org/wp/digital-books-and-your-rights">Digital Books and Your Rights: A Checklist for Readers</a>.</p>
<p>To me a digital book is nothing more than a rights managed HTML page with a few annotation features. All this on an expensive single use reader, that still has many usability issues. No, I have no intention of purchasing an electronic reader in the near future.</p>
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		<title>Street Camera Surveillance</title>
		<link>http://dvector.com/oracle/2006/08/24/street-camera-surveillance/</link>
		<comments>http://dvector.com/oracle/2006/08/24/street-camera-surveillance/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Aug 2006 23:31:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>oracle</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dvector.com/oracle/2006/08/24/street-camera-surveillance/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In response to an editorial in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel dated August 23, 2006, titled &#8216;Survellance isn&#8217;t such a bad thing&#8217; by Jim Brown.
Mr Brown makes the analogy that surveillance cameras in public settings are the equivalent of living in a town where everyone knows who you are. Generally, I agree with the analogy except [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>In response to an editorial in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel dated August 23, 2006, titled &#8216;Survellance isn&#8217;t such a bad thing&#8217; by Jim Brown.</em></p>
<p>Mr Brown makes the analogy that surveillance cameras in public settings are the equivalent of living in a town where everyone knows who you are. Generally, I agree with the analogy except for one critical point.</p>
<p>That point relates to who holds the information of your activities. In a small town, no single person or entity has full knowledge; instead it is aggregated to the whole town. With surveillance cameras, full knowledge is limited to a few entities and there is no aggregate knowledge. This is a very significant difference.</p>
<p>I much prefer the approach taken by author David Brinn in his book <a href="http://www.davidbrin.com/tschp1.html" title="The Transparent Society"> The Transparent Society</a>. Dr Brinn basically argues that (from Wikipedia):</p>
<blockquote><p>True privacy will be lost in the &#8220;transparent society&#8221;; however, we have the choice between one that offers the illusion of privacy by restricting the power of surveillance to authorities, or one that destroys that illusion by offering everyone access (including the ability to watch the watchers).</p>
<p>He argues that it would be good for society if the surveillance is equal for all, and the public has the same access as those in power. He bases this argument upon the claim that the most dangerous and corrupt abuses of power go hand-in-hand with a lack of accountability and transparency.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>The approach taken by The Transparent Society matches Mr. Brown&#8217;s analogy much better than the current system. The current system gives camera access  only to their owners and law enforcement.</p>
<p>Surveillance cameras will become ubiquitous. We might as well get used to that. Then we can calmly consider how we want our future society to function. Surely we will want access to information to be widespread and not limited to a few powerful entities.</p>
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